Introduction
This article investigates individual determinants of the viability of small firms. Until recently, the study of small organizations has been one of the neglected topics within the field of organizational research. However, on theoretical as well as practical grounds, this preoccupation with large and stable organizations seems problematic. In the light of transaction cost analysis, for example, small organizations are an important subject of research (cf. for a recent discussion e.g. Lazerson 1988; Picot et al. 1989) . Transaction cost theory focuses on the size distribution of firms which results from processes of vertical integration and disintegration or from subcontracting and related forms of the organization of work (Williamson 1975) . In terms of transaction cost analysis 'viability' primarily means 'efficiency'. In contrast to this, we will analyse determinants of viability not in terms of properties of exchange relations, but in terms of individual capabilities and experiences. Furthermore, in accordance with the ecological perspective (Aldrich 1978; Carroll 1984; Hannan and Freeman 1989) we do not attempt to study the relative efficiency of various organizational forms directly, but consider organl'zatiotial mortality as a proxy. The central issue of the ecological approach which explicitly addresses small organizations is to explain the diversity and distribution of organizational forms. In this regard it should be noticed that 'small is bountiful' (Granovetter 1984) . It Bfigenhold 1987) . It is not only important to undertake research on small organizations for theory's sake. Current debates in the field of labour market politics are centred, to a large extent, around the topic of job creation processes based on establishing small firms. A starting point for these debates has been Birch's (1987) study of job creation within the U.S. economy. Birch tries to demonstrate the positive effects of foundation and expansion processes of small firms on the growth of the economy. However, Birch (1987: 52) concedes that there may be disadvantages resulting from those growth processes: 'the aggregate, macro stability of an economy flows from its micro instllhility. the instability of the individual firm. The learning process associated with company instability is crucial to long-term adaptivity and job creation.' It is our contention that it is extremely important to explore in more detail the social costs of so-called 'flexibility' within the small firm sector.
Reasoning along these lines, it is tempting to conjecture that organizational research may contribute to the advancement of socinl mohilitv and stratification research. In the light of social mobility research it is necessary to answer the following research question: What are the consequences of various previous career paths and individual characteristics with respect to organizational mortality or other indicators of organizational and individual success (e.g. personal income)? The purpose of this paper may now be expressed either by emphasizing the organizational aspect or the labour market and mobility aspect. First We do not want to question the validity of these arguments in general. Instead, we maintain that these arguments primarily apply to large and medium sized organizations. They are less relevant to young and small business firms which make up the largest fraction of business organizations.
We argue that these small organizations are 'simple' in Mintzberg's (1979: 305-313) sense. Structurally, they are rather simple, there is at most a loose division of labour, a small managerial hierarchy, and hardly any formalization of behaviour. Furthermore, power is centralized in the hands of the 'chief executive' or the owner himself (Mintzberg 1979: 306) . In political respects, these simple organizations correspond to the personal-. ized internal coalition type (Mintzberg 1983: 235-236 (Miller and Droge 1986; Miller and Toulouse 1986 Among these firms, there may be those which failed early and had no chance of requesting a credit. In short, we suspect that there is an incidental sample selection bias in these data (cf. Berk 1983) . Considering the fact that populations of small firms generally exhibit high rates of organizational mortality, one should be very cautious when interpreting Bates' In addition to effects of general and industry-specific human capital we want to consider consequences of investments in firm-specific training. Specific training is defined 'as training that has no effect on the productivity of trainees that would be useful in other firms' (Becker 1975: 26 (1975) Figure 1 . Organizational mortality of small firms varies with ecological and other variables (such as industry, location, etc.). In addition, some variation can be attributed to individual factors. This, in particular, will hold for very small firms since within those organizations entrepreneurial discretion with respect to organizational routines and activities is substantial. These organizations can be described by pointing to their 'simple structure' (Mintzberg) . With regard to human capital, we suggest using entrepreneurial age as a proxy both for the amount of general human capital due to previous experience and for investment in firm-specific training. Notice that the arrows in Figure 1 founders the hazard functions in Figure 4 show first an increasing, and then a decreasing mortality rate. The risk of de-registration is maximal in the second half of the first year. This pattern of the hazard curves contradicts the most common version of the well-known liability-of-newness hypothesis (e.g. Freeman et al. 1983) . The liability-of-newness hypothesis states that very young organizations exhibit the highest mortality rate, and that right from the beginning the risk decreases monotonically. Given the patterns in Figure 4 , which show first an increase and then a decrease, this version of the liability-of-newness hypothesis is not confirmed in our data. There seems to be, so to speak, a 'honeymoon period' (Fichman and Levinthal 1988) for new organizations, and more of a liability-ofadolescence than a liability-of-newness period. The low mortality rate in the first months points to a period of probation where the founder invests a lot of effort into the new firm, and customers give a certain credit to the newcomer (for a more detailed discussion of the liability-of-newness hypothesis based on the Munich data, see Schül3ler 1988). The results discussed so far are mainly based on bivariate analyses and on simple life-table estimates. From these, we arrived at a confirmation of the argument that survival times of firms increase in the first place, and then decrease with increasing age of the, founder. For a more rigorous test, however, it seems appropriate to refer to parametric hazard rate models which allow for a multivariate control of variables (for some comments on the rationale of 'hazard rate models', see our Appendix). In the context of hazard rate models, our hypothesis HI can be expressed as the expectation that the effect of 'age of the founder' on the mortality rate r(t) is negative; the effect of the additional variable 'squared age of the founder' is, however, positive. This specification of the age variable is analogous to the well-known specification of the variable 'work experience' in human capital income functions (cf. Mincer 1974 (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) . In a second step (M2 in (Tuma 1979) . seen in Figure 4, Table 3 cannot answer the question as to whether our industry-specific profiles differ in their degree of convexity). However, to give at least a visual impression of the convex founder-age-mortality profiles, Figure 5 displays the profiles for electrical/ mechanical engineering and consultation, and Figure 6 shows the profiles for the retail and wholesale trade. The profiles in Figure 5 and 6 are based on the parameter estimates of the constant rate models in Table 3 
